Gold Institute report
The GOLD Institute will publish a series of reports with monthly and short-term rhythmicity, in case of significant events, regarding internal or external political environments. The data subject to the analysis are provided from public sources of information, internal sources from political parties, published or discrete research of some public opinion polling institutes (CURS, Sociopol, Avangarde, INSCOP, INSOMAR).
Internal status of parties and presidential candidates (PSD and PNL, February 2023)
PNL
1.Recent evolution
PNL experienced the steepest decrease in the measurements made by the polling institutes in 2022, with the average scores obtained placing it on the 3rd position in the voters’ options. The situation is difficult to manage for the liberals through ordinary recovery measures, because the decay is the effect of a turbulent but random management, implemented in the last 8 years, according to the conjunctural interests of President Klaus Iohannis. The series of PNL presidents incompetent in terms of political organization (Alina Gorghiu, Raluca Turcan, Ludovic Orban, Florin Cîtu, Nicolae Ciucă), presidents seconded by teams of obedient or forcibly disciplined leaders, affairs during elections with support provided by the secret services mobilized by Iohannis, suppressed free competition for the leadership positions in the party, and the cancellation of the meritocratic type of mechanisms, generated the current disaster of PNL, what can be labeled today as the “sick of romanian politics”. Another element that acted destructively for PNL was the administration of the PNL-PDL merger, malfunctioned, never really completed, even today the liberals gather through organizations and divide their functions according to the criterion of old membership in one of the two parties. The separate conclaves according to the PDL or “old-PNL” criterion have multiplied even in the last months, and from here appeared the danger of split, which is predictable to become imminent in the following months, as Iohannis’s authority will melt. Finally, the role assumed by PNL as a “presidential party” (with the negative but real connotation of “my party”), generated the strong intrusion into the activity of the party of the secret services or of the “R Division”, that of the reservists with political and economic interests. The reality after 1989 indicated the strong infiltration in PNL, especially by SIE (due to the legacy of the old liberal agents from DIE), while PDL was controlled by SRI, and here we are talking about the legacy of Băsescu, whose presidential party was infiltrated by the Parallel State administered by Coldea. The presence of Eduard Hellvig in the position of civil director of SRI, old liberal and connoisseur of the PDL protegees, has made the latter migrate en masse in recent years, voluntarily or by being blackmailed, to the R Division, coordinated by the group of SRI reservists from the Basescu period. The other three secret services, SPP, DGIA, DGIPI, have also started to play actively inside PNL, some for manipulating in favor of Iohannis (SPP), others because they have had their path of infiltration smoothed through Ciuca’s presence at the head of the party (DGIA), others out of the implicit need to render services to the head of the ministry, who is also the general secretary of PNL (DGIPI). Thus, the liberals have been acting for several years in the form of groups/gangs that have control levers in the intelligence areas, which has boosted their internal cohesion and the spirit of conservation and political initiative.
2. The current internal state
For the Liberals, the start of 2023 marked the first visible dissent actions, from the public request of former General Secretary Dan Vâlceanu for Ciucă and Bode’s resignations, to the announcement of the establishment of a right-wing forum by former President Florin Cîtu, and culminating with the announcement of the meeting in Maramureş of 14 heads of PNL county organizations, who oppose the current leadership, and where 8 county leaders actually participated. Interesting to note here is the fact that the de facto initiators of the conclave, Ilie Bolojan and Emil Boc, did not participate, invoking different pretexts, Bolojan conspiring his initiative through a meeting with Ciuca in Bucharest, and Boc being blocked by Lucian Bode in Cluj. The PNL meeting at the beginning of the parliamentary session recorded a misleading victory of the current leadership, which imposed its favorites for the leadership of the Chambers, to the detriment of the dissident camp. The former president Ludovic Orban especially contributes, in an organized manner,to the disaggregation of internal cohesion. He founded the Right Force and wants to use the new party as a reservoir for attracting the liberal discontent, and for this purpose he wanders around the country and negotiates especially with those who bring votes, mayors such as Boc or local council presidents like Bolojan. Orban’s action is dangerous for PNL, precisely because it is supported by the R Division, with Coldea in charge, and thus offers him openness and specific arguments for those caught in the Parallel State net, with many of the former pedelists included, and the reservists are finally interested in the PNL split that could strengthen their future electoral front in 2024, consisting of USR/Reper/Right Force, at the command of the External Factor.
The current problem that worries the PNL is the imminent governmental rotation occurring in May, when it has to hand over the steering wheel of the Government to Marcel Ciolacu, which, given the situation described above, will throw the Liberals into a fiery phase of the internal crisis. Iohannis is trying to minimize the effects and has advanced the solution of Ciuca’s remaining in the Government, as defense minister and deputy prime minister, to symbolize the preservation of the governmental authority, but also for future direct negotiations with the US-Pentagon regarding the future president of Romania, it is clear that from there the greatest interventions will be made, he knows this based on recent history, but also through the american interests in the region in the conditions of war. The Liberals are aware of the terrible situation they are in, which generates gloomy electoral prospects for 2024, with an optimistic score below 15%, and then they force the solution of common lists with PSD at all elections next year, with an agreement negotiated and sealed before the rotation in May. The pesdists refuse their proposals for now, aware that the electoral future would be more fruitful for them if they run alone, being reconciled with a nationalist wing within the party and having a discreet post-electoral agreement with UDMR. The PSD’s refusal and the maximum media scandals directed against Ciucă, Bode, Popescu, plus the dissident groups in the party that have been publicly activated, give PNL a deplorable public image and a hysteric internal atmosphere.
3. Presidential candidates
Unlike PSD, which has a consistent presidential seal, PNL currently has no candidate to seriously consider in order to impose itself on the public. Nicolae Ciucă, although considered as a presidential figure, generates jokes or ironies among those who comment on this fact, and the wear and tear of the government and the lack of achievements will even turn him into a detestable politician. Out of the 4 first-presidents, Gheorghe Flutur does not want to candiidate at central level, playing discreetly and somewhat wisely the role of regional leader in Moldova, and Iulian Dumitrescu is not only non-existent at the public level, but also strongly marked by the ”stinking games” from the backstage of the government or by the obligations he has at the level of the reservists of the Parallel State. Dan Motreanu is entangled in all sorts of political-legal-personal combinations and, although he announces himself as a protagonist for any future political competitions, it is predictable that he has no chance for nominations. With Rares Bogdan the situation is different, he has personal strengths that could have brought him to the position of PNL presidential candidate. His activity in “Iohannis’ service” of recent years, carried out imprudently and without self-imposed limits, together with the brazen public support of weak or pathetic prime ministers, such as Orban, Cîtu, Ciucă, have diluted much of the electoral potential with which he came to PNL in 2019, when he had played a decisive role in the party’s electoral victories. The traditionally bad relationship with the pesedists, assumed from the belief that only this is how the “penelism” can be publicly stated, no longer serves them today, especially in the context of possible future common lists. Alina Gorghiu, today the number 2 man in the state, who, with an enviable cynicism and cunning, doubled by the specific strengths of a “woman among men”, has managed a long journey at the top of the power in the party and in the Romanian state, must be included in the analysis list. The effective game of leaving the political camps when they lost the foreground, ensured her longevity, but brought her today into a context of internal and public mistrust, she has a status of “woman-pariah”, whose current power is held only by the connections with the Cotroceni area, or they depend on the utility that the links at the top of PSD confer on it, on the line of Sorin Grindeanu. The potential candidate outside the party, like the Geoana model for PSD, is not yet seen in PNL’s case. Ludovic Orban forces such a perception, announcing his candidacy early, decorating it with the necessary ingredient of the tough anti-Iohannis stance, but this approach appears to be useless, even embarrassing, given the low public trust that the former prime minister still has. The variants of local leaders of PNL as future presidential candidates, such as Emil Boc or Ilie Bolojan, are perceived today as just “coloring”, the first having no courage to assume, being stuck in the trap of the Parallel State or the Group of Cluj, and the second, having no courage to assume the role of the party, not confirming in his political career that he could or wants to enter into any central battle, he did not prove that he has the necessary qualities for this, and whenever he was forced to do so, he preferred to withdraw to the area of Bihor.
Based on the above considerations, we can consider that the names that will be circulated for a period by PNL to obtain the nomination as presidential, are those of Nicolae Ciucă, Rareş Bogdan and Alina Gorghiu. The latter will arise from the necessary condition for a woman to be among the candidates, but also from the desire of Cotroceni to have a member in the game. Rareş Bogdan has the circumstantial advantage of being the only liberal who directs the anti-Romanian strategy of the Austrians or the Dutch from Brussels, but also benefits from the explicit support of some press groups or former colleagues. Nicolae Ciucă is today the first presidential option for PNL, but the support for him will suddenly dilute from the moment he will no longer be prime minister, and he can become “history” quickly, if he loses the function of president of PNL, which is a possible event and will probably become true in the future context of the internal struggles that will increase starting next summer.
